

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday 20 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. N. PETROV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. Z. SEINER

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. R. KRZYŻANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. Von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arabi Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the 153rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

In accordance with the procedural agreement adopted by the Committee at the plenary meeting of 12 August (ENDC/PV.150) the Committee was to discuss first this morning item 5(d) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52). There are no speakers inscribed for item 5(d). Does any representative wish to speak?

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I do not want to make a speech, but I do wish briefly to remind the Committee of the suggestion I made on 14 August (ENDC/PV.151, p. 9) when I said I thought it would be very desirable that there should be an examination of the technical issues involved in nuclear disarmament and that it should start in the relatively near future, perhaps -- though this was a matter, of course, for further discussion -- in some smaller forum than our plenary sessions. I said then that I hoped that the Committee would consider that suggestion favourably, and I also expressed the view that if we could agree that such an examination were, for instance, to start before the end of this year, it would be a very useful step forward. I am afraid my suggestion did not find any echo in the observations, for instance, which our Soviet colleague made at that same meeting. (ibid, p.23) But I do wish to repeat it with such emphasis as I can command, and to say again that if we could find agreement on this point -- and perhaps our Soviet colleague will be able to indicate either now or next week some view on the subject -- we should be making progress on what is one of the most important tasks which we have before us.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak on item 5(d)? If not, the Committee should now take up the next item on the agreed agenda, the question of military bases. As Chairman, however, I should like to note that the agreed procedural arrangements do not preclude any delegation from discussing any topic it may wish to raise at any of our meetings; nor do they preclude the Committee from reverting to item 5(d) at an appropriate time in the future.

In my capacity as representative of the United States, I should like to express the hope that in the meantime all delegations, and the Soviet delegation in particular, will study closely the problems inherent in nuclear disarmament and the United States proposals for beginning the process of such disarmament.

(The Chairman, United States)

My delegation hopes also that this subject will be further discussed at future meetings between the co-Chairmen and that, in spite of present differences and difficulties, some progress on it can be made and eventually reported to the Committee.

We shall now turn to item 5(e).

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Moscow treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, concluded between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and United Kingdom, which the Government of the Romanian People's Republic signed on 8 August, is tangible proof of the idea that litigious international issues can be solved by way of negotiation. At the same time it has opened up fresh possibilities to continue the struggle against the danger created by the armaments race, and particularly by the manufacturing and the stockpiling of atom and hydrogen weapons.

The preamble of the Moscow treaty stresses, as the main goal of the signatory parties:

".... the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons". (ibid)

General and complete disarmament has been, still is and will be the main goal of our endeavours, because only general and complete disarmament represents, under the present circumstances, the radical and sure way to remove the unprecedented danger which is menacing humanity -- the danger of a devastating nuclear war.

The Moscow agreement represents a step forward in the direction of lessening international tension. It is significant that that step was made in a field closely related to the nuclear war danger. The agreed measures cannot be separated from the powerful and continuous concern of the peoples to do away with the nuclear danger.

The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic has repeatedly emphasized in this Committee the particular significance it attaches to the specific disarmament measures to be undertaken in stage I of the process of general and complete disarmament, in connexion with the necessity of liberating mankind from the danger of a nuclear war. We are studying all proposals pertaining to the concrete content

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

of stage I in the light of the necessity to ensure the removal of the nuclear danger right at the beginning of the disarmament process. In so far as a plan for the implementation of general and complete disarmament tends to provide the assurance that, already in the first stage, the danger of a nuclear war is eliminated, such a plan appears acceptable to us and we shall support it.

That concept has determined the attitude of the Romanian delegation with regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and to the measures of nuclear disarmament.

The same criterion also guides our approach to another important issue, namely, disarmament measures with regard to foreign military bases and to armed forces stationed in foreign territories. In the past, in the course of the proceedings of this Committee, the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic has consistently advocated the elimination of such bases already in stage I of general and complete disarmament, as it has advocated also the withdrawal of all armed forces from other countries' territories. This is still our stand. This stand is dictated by the necessity to face up to a reality, a reality that cannot be ignored if we genuinely endeavour to adopt efficient disarmament measures.

Nobody can deny that foreign military bases represent one of the essential elements of the danger of nuclear war hovering above mankind. Military bases organized on foreign territories are a clearly defined military institution, distinct from national bases, from a military-strategic point of view as well as from a political and legal one. No one could give any convincing proof -- no matter how many statements were made -- that foreign military bases are not advanced starting-points for unleashing an armed attack against the States around which they have been set up. That is their main purpose.

Their existence multiplies the hazards and the risk of an accidental war. Indeed, if the presence of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles implies the danger of an outbreak of war by accident -- and this danger is acknowledged by all -- the existence of foreign military bases equipped with such weapons and scattered over numerous parts of the globe increases the danger of an accidental war.

To this we have to add that if the military bases organized on foreign territory and equipped with nuclear weapons are the most dangerous ones, it is no less true that foreign military bases equipped with conventional, non-nuclear weapons also represent a danger for international peace and security, engendering multiple possibilities of unleashing armed conflicts.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The existence of military bases gravely jeopardizes the very security of the States on whose territory they are situated. It is known that the activity being carried on in such bases is not subject to control by the Governments of the respective countries. In those conditions the States on whose territory there are foreign military bases are inevitably exposed to a retaliatory blow caused by military actions of which they might even be ignorant. The conflict between the aggressor and its victim would thus spread over those States, too.

If, from a military point of view, the foreign military bases represent a direct threat not only to the States they are directed against, but also to the countries on whose territories they are sited, from a political point of view they represent a permanent source for the worsening of the international situation, for increasing mistrust and suspicion, and for whipping up cold war. In brief, they are part of the arms race; they represent a factor of permanent threat against international peace and security.

Let us now take up another aspect of the issue. Between the problem of eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and that of abolishing foreign military bases there is a direct connexion. Being sited in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers of other States, foreign military bases acquire a particular strategical significance, serving to a large extent as substitutes for the strategical means of delivery. From such bases an aggression employing nuclear missiles can be unleashed, while considerably reducing the distance and the time needed to hit the targets.

Let us now stress another aspect. The existence of military bases on foreign territories is incompatible with the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and with that of establishing nuclear-free zones -- ideas which are making headway ever more powerfully, their implementation becoming ever more urgent and necessary.

These are, in brief, the reasons why the delegation of Romania stands for the elimination of foreign military bases and for the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territory already in stage I of the process of general and complete disarmament.

What are the prospects that open now before us? If that measure were implemented, then favourable conditions would emerge for the implementation of general and complete disarmament as a whole; a climate of relaxation of international



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tensions would be created; confidence in the relations between States and between peoples would be strongly promoted; the way would be opened for the completion of the complex of measures needed to eliminate, already in stage I and for all time, the danger of a nuclear war; and one of the main obstacles would be removed from the road towards the successful conclusion of other disarmament measures. At the same time, one of the main sources which engender the threat of a surprise attack would be eliminated.

The liquidation, already in stage I of general and complete disarmament, of all military bases on other countries' territories, as well as the withdrawal of the armed forces from those territories, would not create any advantage for one State or group of States to the detriment of some other State or group of States. On the contrary, the implementation of those measures would strongly promote the cause of international peace and of general and complete disarmament, increasing the security of the international community as a whole as well as the security of every particular State.

What is the main argument set forth by the delegations opposing the idea of eliminating foreign military bases in the course of stage I of the disarmament process? In short, this argument -- which is only too well known from our previous debates -- is summed up in the words: "Let us have a balanced disarmament by which no party might obtain at any particular moment an advantage of any kind". In other words, those delegations which so argue say that if the foreign military bases now existing in Europe, Asia, Africa were dismantled then one of the parties, namely the Soviet Union, would acquire certain advantages. That way of reasoning -- as I have already had the opportunity to stress -- lacks real foundation.

One must not lose sight of the fact that the elimination of military bases on foreign territories -- as provided for in the Soviet draft treaty -- is not an isolated element but is part of a whole series of measures which, once they are carried out, cannot create advantages for any of the parties. Those measures are mutually interlocked and interdependent. Under what circumstances is the dismantling of the military bases sited on foreign territories provided for? Under circumstances characterized by the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and by a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

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Under such circumstances one cannot speak about obtaining advantages, about "imbalanced" disarmament. An attentive and realistic appraisal of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) cannot but prove that it contains solid guarantees for the security of all States, at any instant of the disarmament process.

On the contrary, if we were to destroy nuclear weapon vehicles only, while maintaining even part of the military bases on foreign territories, that would entail a serious disadvantage as far as the socialist countries are concerned and would gravely endanger their security. It is for that reason that it is necessary to speak about foreign bases and the need to liquidate them just as it is necessary to speak about the need to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. How could one reconcile the maintenance of foreign bases when nuclear weapon vehicles had been liquidated with the unanimously acknowledged principle that during the process of disarmament no State or group of States should acquire military advantages? That principle must be applied consistently in all fields of disarmament and at every stage of the disarmament process.

The Government of the Romanian People's Republic has taken various opportunities to state clearly its position with regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament and other contingent issues. On 3 August, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Moscow tripartite agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Romanian Government issued the following statement:

"The Government of the Romanian People's Republic expresses its satisfaction on the occasion of the agreement being reached between the USSR, the USA and the United Kingdom on the banning of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

"The Government of the Romanian People's Republic appreciates this agreement as an expression of the policy of peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems, and as a proof of the fact that litigious international issues can be solved by way of negotiations.

"Although the agreement does not cover underground tests, it corresponds to the demands, insistently voiced over the years by world public opinion, to ban nuclear tests, which, by their radiations, represent a danger for the peoples all over the world. At the same time, the Government of the Romanian People's Republic expresses its hope that the conclusion of the agreement will create favourable conditions for the banning of underground tests also.

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"Certainly, the agreement, while representing a step forward in the direction of international détente, does not solve the major problems of the struggle aimed at eliminating the danger which the armaments race and the stockpiling of atom and hydrogen weapons creates for world peace. Being aware of the grave danger a thermonuclear war would represent for the destiny of mankind, the socialist States, other peace-loving States, the peoples of the world perseveringly militate for the cessation of the armaments race, the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, the banning and destruction of atom and hydrogen weapons, general and complete disarmament. By its activity in the United Nations and other international bodies, by its whole external policy, the Government of the Romanian People's Republic, as well as the Governments of the other socialist countries, has made and will make in the future its full contribution to the solution of these issues which are vital for the cause of peace.

"The Government of the Romanian People's Republic declares its readiness to become a party to the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water".

As this Committee knows, on 8 August the Government of the Romanian People's Republic signed that treaty in Moscow, Washington and London.

I request the Secretariat to circulate as an official Conference document the statement of 3 August 1963 of the Government of the Romanian People's Republic.<sup>1/</sup>

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the agreed procedure of work of the Committee we now pass on to consideration of the next problem relating to stage I of general and complete disarmament, that is to say, item 5(e) of the agreed agenda which reads:

"Disarmament measures in regard to military bases and to armed forces at such bases or elsewhere in foreign territories, together with appropriate control measures." (ENDC/52, p.2)

Besides stating the position of the Soviet side we shall also give our views regarding the position of the Western Powers on the question of the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation would like first of all to deal with the question of why the Soviet Union attaches such great importance to this problem.

We have already stated more than once our evaluation of the presence of Western, and in particular United States, military bases on foreign territories and have pointed out the part played by those bases in present-day international relations. We have noted that more than eighteen years have already passed since the end of the second world war, yet the state of affairs in international life is still abnormal. Indeed, can it be considered a normal situation when the United States maintains in peacetime many hundreds of military bases and hundreds of thousands of military personnel outside the boundaries of its country, in foreign territories thousands of kilometres away from the United States? It is not difficult to perceive what a very negative influence this has on the present international situation and on the mutual relations of States. There is no doubt that this is one of the most important causes of the tension in international life today, preventing the normalization of the situation existing in the world and the solution of outstanding international problems. The existence of foreign bases and the stationing of troops on the territories of other countries prevent progress being made in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. We must not forget that nuclear weapons and strategic means of delivery of such weapons, that is bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers and ballistic rockets, are located at those military bases in foreign territories. All this greatly increases the threat of a nuclear missile war and creates for the non-nuclear countries the direct danger of being involved in it.

The resolution adopted at the Conference of forty African States in Addis Ababa is a most convincing indication of the attitude of the peoples towards foreign bases. The resolution included a demand for -

"... the elimination of military bases [in Africa] ...  
which elimination constitutes a basic element of African Independence  
and Unity." (ENDC/93/Rev.1)

Is not the recent proposal of the Presidents of five Latin American (ENDC/87) countries for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Latin America another eloquent indication of the feelings prevailing in the countries of Latin America against nuclear bases? Does it not reflect the concern of those peoples, just as in the case of the African, European, Asian and other peoples, for their security? Of course, it does.

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Every year we have heard from the rostrum of the United Nations appeals for the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, so as to make a contribution to the strengthening of universal peace. We can say with complete justification that the demand for the liquidation of foreign military bases is the demand of all the peoples of the world, the demand of reason and of the conscience of all mankind.

The stationing of military bases in foreign territories leads to a situation in which universal peace and security, and in the first place the security of the countries which make their territory available for foreign military bases, are seriously jeopardized. That is something which everyone should take into account when assessing the role and significance of present-day military bases located in foreign territories. The Soviet Union, whose policy is aimed at consolidating peace, has resolutely and consistently advocated the liquidation of foreign military bases. In his message to the Heads of States and Governments of African countries who took part in the Addis Ababa Conference, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, noted that the sooner the network of foreign military bases and strongholds in all areas of our planet was liquidated, the more secure would be the peace, freedom and independence of all peoples.

Guided by the aim of eliminating as quickly as possible, the threat of a nuclear-missile war hanging over mankind, the Soviet Government envisages the implementation of large-scale effective measures in this respect right in the first stage of disarmament. Such measures - alongside the elimination in stage I of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons with the exception of the so-called protective umbrella - include the complete liquidation of all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those territories. These measures for stage I of disarmament are indissolubly interconnected and must therefore be carried out simultaneously.

Article 9 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides that:

"Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any types. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations

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and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot . . . . . or evacuated to the Territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, page 8)

In order to forestall any devious ways of utilizing foreign territories for the maintenance there of troops and secret military bases, the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides that all the measures listed by us for the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories shall apply also to those military bases which, even though they are considered national bases juridically, are nevertheless used by foreign troops. The appropriateness of that measure is quite obvious. No matter by what juridical formulas the actual possession of a base by foreign military authorities is covered up, such bases, by their functions and their real significance, virtually in no way differ from foreign military bases in the territories of other countries. The measures we have indicated for the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories should also be carried out in regard to those military bases which have been established under international treaties and agreements for their use by other States, irrespective of the presence of foreign troops at such bases at the time of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In this regard we base ourselves on the assumption that such bases, even if they are without any foreign military personnel at a given moment, are prepared spring-boards for the concentration and deployment of expeditionary armed forces destined to operate from foreign territories. The necessity of liquidating that type of military base as well in stage I of complete disarmament is also quite obvious.

Finally, it is necessary to take measures to prevent military bases in foreign territories being re-established or re-constructed in the process of disarmament. Article 9 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides for measures to safeguard States against that danger. In this connexion it is

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provided that:-

"All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and . . . . . pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements to this end". (ibid, pp.8-9)

It is also provided that:-

"The legislatures and governments of the States . . . . . shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory". (ibid, p.9)

The section of the Soviet draft treaty on disarmament dealing with the liquidation of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries provides for all those measures to be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Orgznization. Side by side with the liquidation of foreign military bases in the first stage, the Soviet Union proposes that the withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign personnel should also be carried out in that stage.

Article 10 of the Soviet draft treaty provides that:-

"Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons . . . . . the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories". (ibid.)

It is also provided that all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the installations relating thereto "shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot . . . . . or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops".

Further it is provided that:-

"The measures concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops . . . . . shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory. It shall henceforth be prohibited to despatch foreign troops, military personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories". (ibid)

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Those measures would be taken by means of legislation and government regulations of the States parties to the Treaty. The withdrawal of troops and other measures provided for in article 10 would be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

What is the significance of the Soviet proposals for the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries in stage I of disarmament simultaneously with the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons? In the first place, of course, their significance lies in the fact that the implementation of those measures would virtually make a nuclear attack by one State against another impossible already in the first stage of disarmament, although nuclear weapons would still remain at the disposal of States. The destruction of the means of delivery and, at the same time, of foreign bases located in the territories of other countries -- whether rocket bases, airfields, submarine bases, aircraft carriers or any other land or sea bases -- as well as the withdrawal of troops to their own national territories would fully ensure the achievement of that aim.

At the meetings of the Committee, at which the Soviet proposals for the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries were dealt with, the representatives of the Western Powers opposed their adoption. The main argument which they put forward against our proposals can be summarized as follows: that the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and of foreign bases would, it is alleged, upset the existing balance of forces in favour of the Soviet Union. Thus, at the meeting of 24 April the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, referring to the aforesaid Soviet proposals, said:

"Those two proposals, we believe, are quite clearly designed to undermine the defensive capabilities of the free world alliances and to alter the military balance in favour of the Soviet Union". (ENDC/PV.124, pp.35 and 36)

In that connexion we should like to raise the question: what advantages would the Soviet Union gain in comparison with the Western Powers? After all, the gist of the Soviet proposal consists in combining the destruction of the means of delivery in stage I with the simultaneous liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories. The combination of those two measures guarantees compliance with the agreed principle which states that:-

".... at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage ...." (ENDC/5, p.2)



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet proposals are fully in accordance with that principle. For its part, the Soviet Union agrees to the elimination of missiles, which form the most important part of its military potential and in which it has outstripped the United States. That is not an empty claim; it is a fact which is frankly admitted even by United States missile experts.

Adoption of the Soviet proposal would have extremely valuable consequences for the United States in stage I, since the United States, right at the beginning of disarmament, would regain the inviolability of its territory which it lost, as is well known, as a result of the development of nuclear missiles. Thus the security of the United States would be ensured. On the other hand, under the Soviet draft treaty, the United States must agree to the elimination of its military bases located in foreign territories.

The radical improvement in the whole international situation as a result of the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases is regarded by the Soviet Union as a big gain for the security of everyone -- for the Soviet Union and its allies, for the United States and its allies, and for all the non-aligned countries.

In opposing the Soviet proposals, the Western representatives resort to yet another argument. Trying to minimize the tremendous significance of the implementation of this Soviet proposal for reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war, the representatives of the Western Powers have said that an attack could be carried out with the use of conventional armaments. But how can one put forward such an argument without contradicting the facts? Under the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament, the armed forces and conventional armaments of all States, including the Soviet Union, would be substantially reduced in stage I. After the measures of the Soviet plan for stage I had been completed, the Soviet Union and other socialist States would gain no advantages whatsoever over the Western Powers. After all, it is a fact that, under the Soviet draft treaty, during stage I of disarmament the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States would be reduced to the same level: 1,900,000 men each for the United States and the Soviet Union.

The paradoxical position of the Western Powers is that, on the one hand, they declare that they fear Soviet superiority in conventional armaments, but, on the other hand, when the Soviet Union proposed the greatest possible reduction of armed

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forces and conventional armaments and the establishment of the lowest possible force level, identical for the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States objects. So what do you really want, gentlemen?

The representatives of the Western Powers also put forward against the Soviet's proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries the argument that the implementation of that proposal would upset stability, aggravate the international situation and, as a result, jeopardize peace. But that is not an argument; it is a naked, entirely unsubstantiated assertion at variance with the facts, logic and common sense. We are being told, it seems, that if States establish military bases in foreign territories and station strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons and their armed forces at such bases, by acting in that way they are strengthening peace, but that if these States were to agree to liquidate military bases in foreign territories and not to station there the means for waging war and to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, peace, you see, would be jeopardized. Such an "argument" can convince no one but its authors. If States agree to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and to do away with such a source of international tension as foreign military bases and troops in foreign territories, there can be no doubt that as a result of these measures peace would be greatly strengthened. That is an axiom obvious to everyone and needing no proof.

Let us now see what the Western Powers propose in regard to foreign military bases and foreign troops in the territories of other countries.

A study of the measures for stage I proposed in that part of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ENDC/30) which deals with these questions shows that in this document among stage I measures there is not even any mention of foreign military bases in other countries' territories, as though such bases did not exist at all. But such bases do exist all the same. They are, as we have already pointed out, an important international factor and have an extremely negative effect on the international situation. For this reason it is impossible to discuss seriously the problem of general and complete disarmament and to map out ways for its speedy solution without even saying a single word about the liquidation of foreign military bases and the related question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries' territories.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Let us consider the various stages of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.

Let us begin with stage I. The United States outline contains no corresponding provision concerning the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed in foreign territories. Yet this same outline provides from the very outset, that is, in stage I, for the reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. What would be the practical consequence of the implementation of such a measure in stage I? As is well-known, the Soviet Union liquidated long ago its bases in foreign territories, and one of the decisive means of defence of the Soviet Union is now the rocket weapon. The United States proposes reducing in stage I this extremely important means of defence of the Soviet Union, while at the same time leaving intact the United States military bases in foreign territory which are aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist States and at which United States nuclear weapons are located, and the troops stationed in foreign territories around the Soviet Union and other socialist States. I ask you, how does this comply with the principle of ensuring the equality of States from the standpoint of their security, the principle so often referred to by the representatives of the Western Powers? Is it possible after this to regard the United States plan as a balanced one, as giving no advantage to either side or as taking into account the security interests of States? No, it is impossible.

The implementation of this plan would lead to the United States gaining unilateral military advantages, to which the Soviet Union, of course, cannot and will not agree. As a real basis for agreement there should be a combination of measures for the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons with measures for the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries' territories.

It is characteristic that, even in regard to the measures envisaged for stage II, in the United States plan there is no direct mention of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from other countries' territories. It only mentions a reduction of agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located. But will it not turn out that when we come to agreeing on such bases, the whole matter will boil down to a proposal to reduce a certain number of so-called national bases while foreign bases will remain intact? As you see, stage II in the United States plan likewise does not guarantee the liquidation of foreign bases in other countries' territories. Even in respect of stage III, when the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

disarmament process is to be completed, the United States plan provides for the retention of agreed military bases and facilities.

In the course of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Soviet delegation has repeatedly analyzed the attempts of some representatives to equate so-called national bases with foreign military bases. But this question seems perfectly clear to us. A foreign base and a so-called national base are not one and the same thing. As a matter of fact, is it correct to speak of national bases? There does actually exist in the world the military and political problem of foreign military bases, which are an instrument of aggression and a means of interference in the internal affairs of other States. As for so-called national bases, there is simply no problem in regard to them as such. After all, so-called national bases are in reality various installations and services in places where a particular State's own armed forces are stationed in its own territory. These armed forces, with all the major and ancillary installations, services, workshops, depots and so on, will all gradually be reduced and eliminated as the disarmament process develops from stage to stage.

If States eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, for instance, in stage I, they will have to destroy all installations connected with them: launching pads, shafts, platforms for the launching of rockets and underground depots for rockets. The installations connected with the conventional armaments of States would be dealt with in a similar way.

As you see, there is a fundamental difference between national bases and foreign military bases. Bases in foreign territories are mailed fists with concentrations of troops and the most modern military equipment, especially, of course, thermo-nuclear weapons placed adjacent to the territory of a State or States regarded as potential targets for attack.

The representatives of the Western Powers are trying to prove to us that foreign military bases situated thousands of kilometres away from their national frontiers and encircling the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are, allegedly, a means of defence. It is obvious that such assertions are completely unfounded. From the military point of view, it is impossible to justify with defence considerations the organization of a system of military bases many thousands of miles away from their national territories. Regretfully we must point out that in this respect recent events have not brought about any positive changes. Events continue to develop further and further in a direction extremely unfavourable to the cause of peace.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The United States is taking measures which considerably increase the danger of a thermonuclear war breaking out. The United States, in addition to territorial, that is immobile, stationary bases abroad, is hastily developing a system of mobile floating bases -- atomic submarines, equipped with nuclear weapons and the strategic means for their delivery, namely Polaris missiles. These floating bases are intended for cruising about the high seas and oceans right now -- in peace time, I stress, in peace time -- in full combat readiness. There are United States atomic submarines with Polaris missiles in United Kingdom waters and in the Pacific Ocean. It is well known that the first specimens of such floating bases -- atomic submarines with Polaris missiles -- have already been despatched by the United States to the Mediterranean Sea and that their presence constitutes a threat to the security of the countries situated in that area. Undoubtedly such a development of events will still further increase the risk of war. A stop must be put to this. This must be done, if we really wish to lay a genuine, not a sham, fictitious basis under the cause of disarmament, if we are striving for a real easing of tension in international relations. By their nature, foreign military bases in other countries' territories and floating bases roaming about the high seas and oceans in peace time are intended for aggression and not for defence. Therefore, it naturally becomes essential that in a treaty on general and complete disarmament the question of foreign military bases should be considered and settled in a proper manner. Precisely this approach underlies the relevant provisions of the Soviet draft treaty.

The President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, in his speech on 26 July, made a realistic statement. He said:

"For in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase, . . . ." (ENDC/102, p.5).

That is a statement to which it would be difficult for anyone to object. But the maintenance by the United States of America of military bases in other countries' territories and its endeavour to bring its missile bases nearer to the frontiers of other States precisely represent the carrying out in practice of the "arms increase" mentioned by President Kennedy in his speech. It is high time to draw practical conclusions in regard to foreign military bases in other countries' territories. In the present situation foreign bases are an anachronism; far from being an innocuous one, it is exceedingly dangerous. It is necessary to put an end as quickly as possible to this anachronism and take the path of an agreed decision

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to liquidate all foreign military bases. The interests of peace demand this. Look around you, gentlemen. Many countries, including members of our Committee, for example, Sweden, Brazil, Mexico and others have no foreign military bases in their territory. But is their security harmed or lessened on that account? Or, on the other hand, is the security of the United States harmed by the fact that it has no military bases in those countries? It can be asserted with every justification, and I think that everyone who wishes to maintain peace will agree, that the countries with no foreign military bases in their territory are much more secure than the countries which have such bases. We propose and urge that we should approach the question of foreign military bases from the standpoint of concern for universal security. We shall then have no difficulty in resolving this question to our mutual satisfaction.

A detailed analysis of the United States proposals in the part relating to military bases shows that these proposals cannot be a suitable basis for agreement. Whatever the measures proposed, if they are not aimed at averting or at least at seriously reducing the threat of a nuclear war, such measures are absolutely useless or even detrimental to the security of States, since in substance they lead to the establishment of control without disarmament. The Soviet Union considers that the interests of the common security of all of us call for the implementation of radical disarmament measures in stage I. We hope that the United States and its partners will reconsider their attitude towards the question of liquidating military bases in foreign territories and towards the question of withdrawing troops from foreign territories, and in that way it will be possible to achieve a mutually acceptable solution of this issue. We express the hope that all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will study the Soviet Union's proposals relating to foreign bases and troops in other countries' territories with the attention that these important problems of general and complete disarmament deserve.

The new and more favourable situation which has come about as a result of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests enables us to have a new, broader and bolder approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Speaking as representative of the United States, I should merely like to say that as my delegation occupies the Chair this morning it will not speak today on the topic under discussion, but will defer a

(The Chairman, United States)

statement of the United States' position -- and a reply to the statements made this morning by the representatives of Romania and the Soviet Union -- until the next meeting at which the Committee has this topic under discussion.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): If I speak today, Mr. Chairman, you will be able to put the Polish delegation down on the list of those to which you will reply next week.

The liquidation of bases situated in foreign territory and the withdrawal of troops stationed in such territory is among the most urgent of the problems which have to be solved during the disarmament process. That explains why this problem occupies such a prominent place in the plan for general and complete disarmament submitted to our Committee by the Soviet Union. (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Corr.1) Nobody denies, indeed, that the question deserves very special attention. After the preliminary study that it carried out last autumn, the Committee now has an opportunity of undertaking a thorough discussion of the problem of the liquidation of foreign bases, in accordance with the programme of work which we have adopted.

The discussions which have hitherto been held on the subject in our Committee have revealed the existence of two points of view. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and the delegations of socialist countries call for the liquidation of foreign bases during the first stage of disarmament, together with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the United States and the Western delegations oppose the separate consideration of the problem of the liquidation of foreign bases and propose a partial liquidation of military bases -- without specifying which bases -- during the second stage of disarmament, concurrently with the percentage reduction of armaments.

It is noteworthy that the draft submitted by the United States (ENDC/30) delegation does not say how these bases are to be liquidated and troops withdrawn from foreign territory, whereas the Soviet draft deals with these two problems explicitly in articles 9 and 10 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union representative rightly drew our attention to this point in the statement he made just now.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I should like once again to dwell briefly on the arguments which the Western delegations have advanced against the thesis put forward by the socialist delegations concerning the necessity of eliminating foreign bases. These arguments are mainly based on three premises. In the first place, it is alleged that the bases are a vital element in the defence system of the United States and its allies. Secondly, an attempt is made to convince us that they are an indispensable factor in maintaining the balance of power between East and West. Thirdly, it is alleged that these bases are necessary for the countries in whose territory they are situated.

All these arguments seem to me to be specious and I think that they can be easily refuted. Their main defect lies in the fact that they are totally divorced from the realities of the world as it is today.

It is undeniable that, in an age of inter-continental ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads which can reach any point on earth and there cause death and destruction, a defence system based on a network of bases situated thousands of miles from the national territory makes no sense for the great Powers which possess such weapons. It is enough to compare the power of the weapons concentrated in their national territory and abroad to convince ourselves of this. It is also difficult to believe that, in these circumstances, bases situated in foreign territory represent an important factor in the maintenance of the balance of power, since the main strategic forces of the parties are located elsewhere.

The same is true if we consider the importance of these bases as support points for conventional forces. Here again, it is enough to compare the human and economic potentials of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and of the States members of the Atlantic Alliance to realize that the assertion that the withdrawal of foreign forces might weigh heavily in the balance is completely unfounded.

Let us now consider the value of the contention that these bases are important as a means of defence for the countries in whose territories they are situated. It is obvious enough that, from the point of view of the defence of these countries, the bases have no value at all. On the contrary, their presence is a constant threat to the security of these countries, because the States which are entitled to regard themselves as threatened by the existence of these bases are obliged to take a whole series of military counter-measures aimed against those bases, and cannot fail to react to the presence of missiles equipped with nuclear warheads installed



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on launching pads and aimed at their territory. Thus, far from strengthening their own security, countries which allow the installation of foreign bases in their territory are taking considerable risks.

It is clear that, in present circumstances, the military bases established by the Western Powers in foreign territory have another purpose in view. One need not be a military expert to understand that, from the point of view of defence strategy, the part played by these bases is practically negligible. But this role becomes considerably more important if it is regarded from the point of view of offensive strategy. Such bases give a potential aggressor an opportunity to concentrate near his victim's frontiers the military forces necessary for embarking upon aggression. We should also take into account the fact that, in the present state of affairs, since these forces are liable to annihilation by a nuclear counter-attack, they can be effectively used only as part of a surprise operation.

Foreign bases therefore can only be regarded as a factor of preparation for aggression. But that is not all. The military bases which the Western Powers have established in all parts of the world also fulfil a political function, as an element of pressure in the interest of the stronger side.

They facilitate interference in the domestic affairs of the countries in whose territory they are situated. The existence of these bases of the Western Powers is often linked with the maintenance of reactionary and dictatorial Governments, whose only merit is that they accept the presence of foreign armed forces in their national territory.

Military bases in foreign territory have always been and still are an element of the policy of conquest. This is well realized by countries which have long borne the colonial yoke. The presence of these bases represents a constant threat to the independence of many countries of Africa and Asia. It is a source of international tension and is the military basis of the neo-colonialist policy which certain Powers still wish to practise in the newly-independent countries.

The Polish delegation believes that the existence of military bases in foreign territory is in itself an evil which should be abolished as soon as possible. There can be no doubt that such a measure would help to improve the international atmosphere, to increase confidence in relations between States, to halt the armaments race and to open up the path towards the peaceful solution of many political problems.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

But we are not now considering the problem of the liquidation of military bases on foreign soil as a preliminary measure. We are considering it in the context of a series of measures proposed for stage I of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/2/Rev.1). According to that plan, the abolition of these bases would be carried out concurrently with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and with a considerable reduction of conventional armed forces, all these measures being accompanied by adequate international control.

The measures provided for in stage I of the Soviet plan form a coherent whole and, within the framework of this series of measures, the solution of the problem of foreign bases should not present any major difficulties.

After the total elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the limitation of conventional armaments, the maintenance of military bases on foreign soil would be meaningless from the military point of view. Those bases would lose their raison d'être, and the same would be the case if, instead of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons altogether during stage I, a certain number of inter-continental missiles were retained by the Soviet Union and the United States in their territories according to the Gromyko plan. (A/PV.1127, prov.p.38-40)

The attitude of the United States delegation and the other Western delegations to the problem of the elimination of military bases on foreign soil obviously cannot be dissociated from the general conception of disarmament held by the Powers they represent. It is in this context that I should like briefly to examine the consequences of maintaining these bases after a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In view of the number of United States bases situated near the frontiers of socialist countries, there can be no doubt that their maintenance would make atomic aggression possible, both by means of strategic and tactical atomic weapons. The maintenance of these bases would facilitate preparations for a surprise attack, owing to the possibility of deploying and concentrating the necessary weapons at a given point.

The desire shown by the United States to leave bases in foreign territory intact throughout the disarmament process further diminishes the effectiveness of the percentage reduction of means of delivery of nuclear weapons which it proposes. It is obvious that, with the maintenance of considerable stocks of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery and with the mobility which these weapons would retain

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

owing to the existence of foreign bases, the danger of a nuclear attack would remain throughout the whole process of disarmament. But it is our duty to try to reduce this danger to a minimum from the outset of disarmament, according to the principle of equal security for all.

This difference of approach to the problem of the elimination of foreign bases is but a reflection of the two opposed concepts of disarmament which have already become evident in our discussion of other problems.

One concept, that represented by the socialist countries, is based on qualitative criteria. Disarmament is regarded as a logical sequence of measures, each of which should create a qualitatively new situation through the successive elimination, beginning with the most dangerous weapons, of specific types of armaments and the removal through direct action of factors which promote the armaments race and place world peace in constant jeopardy.

Under the second concept, that represented by the Western countries, the disarmament process is regarded as a sum of quantitative measures which, in an indeterminate future, would reduce the military potential of States to zero. The Western Powers wish to persuade us that a partial and quantitative reduction of armaments entails a proportionate reduction in the danger of war.

In actual fact, however, this is not true, for the armaments race is not a static process. Technical and scientific developments, the political, social and economic consequences of the armaments race, as well as the existence of numerous political problems requiring urgent solution, are all factors which produce cumulative effects, so that the threat of war increases by geometrical progression. Such measures as the percentage reduction of armaments, while bases in foreign territory remain intact, cannot strengthen international security to any appreciable extent. So long as the factors promoting the armaments race remain, the threat of nuclear war cannot be eliminated, and every quantitative reduction of armaments will soon be compensated by other measures.

That is why we have always considered it necessary to take from the outset radical measures which are capable not only of halting the process engendering the armaments race, but also of reversing the course of events. Of course, radical disarmament measures will lead to radical changes in the military structure of States, but these changes will in no way affect their defensive potential. No weapons will be destroyed except those which can serve aggressive purposes only, and such a development must be in the interests of all parties. It is also the only way in which we can fulfil our task, namely the consolidation of peace in a world without armaments.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has listened most attentively to the interesting statements made by the representatives of Romania, the Soviet Union and Poland. First of all, I should like to note with satisfaction the moderate tone of these statements, for we have been accustomed to a rather different tone whenever the question of bases has been raised. That is a very welcome result of the new atmosphere established in the Committee, and I think that all the Western delegations, and particularly the Italian delegation, will wish to follow suit. For that reason, I shall study with the closest attention the points made in the statements I have just mentioned. I must say that, at first sight, despite their attractive presentation, the statements of the three representatives of the delegations of socialist countries did not seem to contain anything very new. I should therefore like to make it clear from the outset that the Italian delegation cannot accept the distinction between foreign and other bases on which the representatives of the socialist countries still lay so much stress. Every country is free, I think, to organize its defence as it sees fit until general and complete disarmament ensures the maintenance of peace and international order directly and by specific means. Thus, it has been decided in the West, as the result of free discussion in our parliaments elected by our peoples, that defence should be ensured jointly, through a common effort, taking into account a specific geographical reality, characterized, as every one knows, by the very great distances which separate our United States Allies from their European partners.

I hasten to add that these jointly organized bases are, as every one knows, defensive bases. This characteristic is perfectly obvious, since they are included in the framework of the general defence organization of the West, which is purely defensive, which threatens no one and which has given tangible proofs of its will to peace.

I also think that by taking certain joint decisions recently concerning Italian territory in particular the Italian Government and the allied Governments wished to show their desire to eliminate any possibility of suspicion and any appearance that certain bases might have an offensive or threatening character. Moreover, it has already been shown here by means of very convincing and valid technical arguments -- I am thinking in particular of a masterly statement by Mr. Godber (ENDC/PV.137, pp.23 et seq.) -- that mobile submarine bases, which I do not believe to be the monopoly of the West, are specifically conceived for defensive purposes.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Of course we hope that all bases, whether described as foreign or not, will be eliminated as soon as possible, in a balanced and controlled manner, through the progressive application of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

It should not be forgotten that to that end the United States disarmament plan proposes (ENDC/30) that the bases -- all the bases -- should be deprived of 30 per cent of their armaments at stage I. That would constitute a very important step forward, achieved in accordance with the principle of gradual and balanced progress. However, as I have already said, my delegation reserves the right to speak on this subject at the next meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-third plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stelle, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, the Soviet Union, Poland and Italy.

"The delegation of Romania tabled a statement of the Government of the Romanian People's Republic, dated 3 August 1963, on the Moscow agreement on a nuclear weapon test ban.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 22nd August 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

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<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/111

